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Observing presidential elections in Belarus Republic 
Igor Botan, September 9, 2001  
 
 
Mission 
 
Monitoring democratic and electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova, Central 
Europe and CIS is the main mission of the Association for the Development of 
Participatory Democracy "ADEPT". This was the reason why I accepted to be a 
member of the short term OSCE observation mission which was to observe 
September 9 presidential elections in the Republic of Belarus.  
 
OSCE Observation mission has already officially commented on the conduct of 
elections. In addition, the delegation of Moldovan MPs also expressed its point of 
view. Multiple viewpoints give a better picture of the conduct of elections; this is why 
I decided to present my own impressions as well. OSCE mission is not responsible for 
the contents of this material.  
 
 
Personal impressions on discussions with locals 
 
At the briefing organized by OSCE, international observers were instructed that 
Mensc is a safe city and they could easily walk on the streets until late at night.  
 
This and many other positive impressions contrasted with the way Belarus is 
portrayed by foreign press, especially the Russian one. This contrast motivated me to 
better understand economic, social and political aspects of the Belarus Republic. Of 
great help in this respect were discussions with locals representing different social 
strata.  
 
It's not easy to understand what's going on in Belarus by reading newspapers. One 
should get up early to buy newspapers that reflect other than official points of view. 
On the one hand opposition press is not prohibited, on the other general public has a 
limited access to it due to the low turnout and higher price than to the official press. 
Although not very original, this is a very efficient way of having total control of the 
media in a country. Formally there are no grounds for accusing state authorities of 
limiting citizens' access to information, although it is clear: those who control money 
flow control media as well. Whenever state authorities feel under threat, they do not 
hesitate to confiscate the entire edition right from the printing house, cases like this 
were registered during the previous electoral campaigns.  
 
Ordinary people sincerely support the President, his main merit being his ability to 
speak the same language as ordinary people. Even the most simple posters 
representing Lukashenka holding in his arms a small girl are accompanied by text for 
the easier understanding of the message: I hold in my strong arms this … child - our 
Belarus as a tender and fragile girl - our blue-eyed Belarus. Thus, people see 
Lukashenka as the man of the Belarus nation, man from the people and close to 
people for better or for worse (even if he is the cause of the problems ordinary citizens 
are facing). Obviously the above message is very appealing to the people crazy about 
soap operas. And there are a lot of those people in the former soviet space.  
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Lukashenka's propaganda doesn't rely exclusively on exploiting peoples emotions. 
Ordinary people are informed that according to the United Nations' report on human 
development Belarus rating is higher than that of other CIS countries, even Russia. 
The propaganda explains the high rating by the fact that Lukashenko stopped illegal 
privatization, kept workplaces, managed to provide citizens with a minimum social 
security and won the race for peace. I was surprised that many people ended the 
discussion with the phrase - if only there wasn't a war, we would survive anything.  
 
As for the intellectuals, as is the case of the entire post-communist space they 
understand perfectly well what is going on and why, but they fail to unite their efforts 
to impose their point of view and provide a viable alternative to the great majority of 
the population.  
 
 
X-ray of a political carrier 
 
Belarus intellectuals use all the means they can to show that the greatest of 
Lukashenka's talents is to make a political career. During the Perestroika he joined 
Belarus Peoples Front so as to be promoted as an ardent fighter for national ideals. 
Those who promoted him as the head of the Parliament Commission for Fighting 
Corruption in the hope that he would fail had greatly underestimated his political 
talent. It wasn't meant for their hopes to come true. The work in the commission was 
for Lukashenko a take off for the presidential seat. Once in the presidential seat, 
Lukashenko proved his political talent especially with regard to concentrating all the 
power in his hands. For him the results justified the means. He breached the 
agreements with the Parliament and Constitutional Court. Later followed a 
referendum on the modification of the Constitution, dissolution of the Parliament, 
elimination of political opponents and former allies - all of those for one single 
purpose, i.e. concentration of power in his hands. His political intuition told him that 
he would need an external ally. That is why the nationalist slogans were changed for 
the ones expressing infinite love for Russia and desire to reunite with the motherland. 
A perfect move, aimed to sooth the guilt of the Russian President, Boris Eltin, for 
disintegrating the USSR, and the revenge syndrome of the Russian political elite 
willing to see Russia as a superpower. As a reward for his integration efforts, 
Lukashenko got the support of the Russian political elite, which allowed him to 
consolidate his power. Now very few remember the Russian political elite 
(Chernomirdin, Stroiev, Selezniev) landing to Mensk in November 1996. They 
convinced the Parliament and Constitutional Court to stop the impeachment of 
Lukashenko. This allowed the latter to take over the initiative and turn the 
developments to his favor.  
 
As for the economy, he established some privileged relations with Russia. Easy access 
of the Belarus products to the Russian market, low prices for the imported oil, gas, 
and other raw materials from Russia - are the main pillars of the centralized Belarus 
economy. Every time Russian officials tried to discuss Russia - Belarus economic 
relations outside the context of the preferential friendship ties, Lukashenko would 
present Belarus as the only security guarantee for Russia at its western border, 
especially in the context of NATO enlargement. Obviously, Russia would have to pay 
for this privilege. Once exploited to his own benefit, Lukashenko rapidly forgot the 
Russia - Belarus union ideals. Thus in his electoral platform for September 9, 2001  
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the focus was on: Belarus sovereignty and independence may not be questioned, our 
children and grandchildren will live in a sovereign country, Belarus people will 
determine themselves their future, Belarus foreign policy will be multidimensional, 
partnership with Russia is a priority of the Belarus foreign policy - not a single world 
about Russia - Belarus Union. As for the strategic partnership with Russia, this is 
obviously a priority as Russia is the largest market for Belarus products. In addition, 
Russia is the greatest supplier of gas, oil, and other raw materials.  
 
 
Distinguishing observers 
 
President Lukashenko's administration paid a great deal of attention to the way 
electoral campaign is unfolding. Everything was properly calculated and arranged. 
Even international observers were invited. Though, it should be mentioned that 
international observers were treated differently. OSCE long-term mission was 
hindered to timely perfecting the visas to enter the Belarus Republic. Their arrival was 
delayed until everything had been arranged. Relations with the OSCE mission 
remained tensed until the end of the observation mission. On the contrary, short-term 
observers representing CIS Parliaments enjoyed the best treatment, fact reflected in 
their observation reports. All of them unanimously declared that presidential elections 
in Belarus were free and fair. Even domestic observers were treated differently. Those 
representing opposition political parties and NGOs were discriminated and 
humiliated. Although they had upon them accreditation, observers were declined the 
right to enter the polling stations especially during anticipated voting. To enter the 
polling stations they used to ask OSCE observers to go along with them. On the 
contrary domestic observers representing workers' unions were omnipresent, serving 
as a democratic shield to the elections. To have an understanding of the workers' 
unions impartiality, it should be mentioned that in Belarus President Lukashenko 
appoints heads of local public administration, who in their turn appoint directors of 
the economic entities and chiefs of election bodies in the relevant region. As a result 
directors of the economic and administrative units served in the election commission, 
whereas their employees (workers' unions) as observers of the electoral process.  
 
As for the OSCE observers - we enjoyed a "very special treatment". Sometimes poll 
workers openly expressed their hostility towards us. For instance to the question - 
How many observers are registered at the poling station? - they would reply - We do 
not answer such kind of questions? When observers tried to convince them that it is 
the right of an observer to ask questions and get an answer, that this is a common 
practice for OSCE observers to monitor electoral process in the countries of Europe 
and North America members of the OSCE, they would reply - How would you like 
your country to observed in such a manner? Certainly people were instructed to reply 
in such a manner. One could get no information at all, not to speak about number of 
early voting. On the contrary directors of the schools where polling stations were 
opened were all politeness. They met us at the entrance and invited us to see the 
chemistry, physics, or other classes. We learned from domestic observers about this 
tactics of the poll workers to distract observers from monitoring the electoral process.  
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Election observation 
 
It was very important for the observers to monitor early voting. In compliance with 
the Belarus law citizens may start voting five days prior to elections. The entire 
history of elections experience A century experience of elections indicates the need of 
conducting elections in such a manner as to ensure maximum transparency and avoid 
any kind of manipulations. Belarus, though, neglected this experience on the under 
the pretext of care for the simple citizen who on the Election Day might be 
somewhere at the "datcha". After elections we learned that as much as 15% of the 
electorate voted before elections. What might have happened with the ballot boxes in 
the five days preceding the elections, when during daytime only 2 poll workers 
guarded them and during the night two policemen - only God knows. Especially as 
the ballots were printed on ordinary paper and apparently at an ordinary Printing 
House. One could make copies of the ballots without any poll worker to notice the 
difference.  
 
The election process seemed well organized. Poll stations were equipped almost 
exemplarily and voters voted quietly. During the five days of early voting, poll 
workers took and posted outside the polling place Lukashenko's electoral posters. 
There was a joke that Sidorov Sidor Sidorovici will win the elections. The thing is that 
in each of the booth a poster was posted explaining the voting procedure. The sample 
ballot represented on the poster included the name of Ivanov, Petrov, and Sidorov. It 
so happened that on the sample ballot voters' choice was indicated against Sidorov, 
which is exactly were Lukashenko name was listed on the real ballot. A minor fact but 
who knows how many voters it influenced?  
 
Later on we realized that everything was staged so as to avoid any kind of surprises. 
At the polling station where I observed vote counting, all the observers were 
forbidden to approach the table where the ballots were counted closer than 15 meters. 
As the commission members surrounded the table it was impossible to see anything. 
After the votes were counted we were refused the right to inspect the ballots. The only 
thing that was offered to us was a protocol on the election results. There was no way 
to verify the authenticity of the results. Other observers reported the same thing.  
 
The program for the election day included a visit to the regional electoral commission 
where protocols with the precinct election results were submitted. We were surprised 
that policemen didn't allow us to enter the premises where we were invited several 
days earlier. Policemen told us that we would be invited in due time. So we waited for 
3 hours. We were still waiting when the Belarus Television broadcast live from the 
CEC election results per country. My colleague from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs said then - all this is part of the big scenario to humiliate us after they 
had invited us to observe their elections!  
 
The only way to protest to such a treatment was to give up the meeting with the 
territorial commission. Later we learned that all the 17 teams, which observed 
elections in Gomel region, had the same fate. The last straw was the disconnection off 
all the telephones in the mission.  
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I asked the domestic observers why Lukashenko administration relied on such 
methods, when he could have won in the first round only by using his propaganda. 
The reply was - Lukashenko's goal was not only to win elections but also to 
demoralize opposition for a long time. If they treated international observers this way, 
then how did they treated domestic observers?  
 
For me to better understand the hopelessness of the situation, our Belarus colleagues 
told us a joke about the serene Belarus people as compared to the neighborhood 
countries. A Polish, Ukrainian and a Belarus attend a conference. They sit together on 
three chairs all of them due to someone's ill will have nails. The Poll feeling the nail 
stands up and makes a polite remark to the organizers. The Ukrainian revolts violently 
takes the nail and throws in into the organizers. The Belarus feeling uncomfortable 
because of the nail, stays still thinking that if the nail is there it is there for a reason...  
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Presidential elections in Transdnestria 
December 11, 2001  
 
 
Despite the fact that several weeks ago, the President of the Republic of Moldova 
declared that upcoming elections in Transdnestria are illegitimate, presidential 
elections were conducted on December 9, 2001. As it was to be expected, Igor 
Smirnov won. According to the preliminary results he was cast 85% of the votes. Last 
year Smirnov initiated modification of the Constitution of the breakaway 
Transdnestrian region. And this was an indication to intention to stay in office for life.  
Let's see review the events that preceded Smirnov's election. Exactly a year ago, when 
the President of the Republic of Moldova was elected by Parliament, the future 
President, Vladimir Voronin, at that time the leader of the communist faction 
announced after a short visit to Moscow that he has the solution for settling 
Transdnestrian conflict. He also stated that the conflict would be solved upon the 
change of the breakaway region leadership.  
 
Once elected President Vladimir Voronin issued a decree outlining strategic 
objectives for a final resolution of the Transdnestrian conflict.  
 
At that time, Ilie Ilascu was released from prison after years of detention in 
Transdnestrian prisons. Nicolae Cernomaz gave more insight on the details of the 
Ilascu's release, at the request of President Voronin a simple phone call was made 
from Moscow. It is believed that Cernomaz had a bitter price to pay for his sincerity - 
his job.  
 
Back then, Smirnov obeyed, but insinuated that he is not willing to mechanically 
execute Moscow's orders, which are made at the request of President Voronin. He 
took some measures to change the situation in his favor; firstly he ceased the dialog 
process with Voronin. Secondly, he prevented Voronin from visiting Noul Neamt 
Monastery (in Transdnestria). Furthermore he introduced Transdnestrian passports 
instead of the old Soviet ones. All of these made Voronin declare Smirnov an 
obstructionist. Though Voronin added he knows some ways to make Smirnov more 
cooperative in negotiations.  
 
Upcoming presidential elections were an excellent opportunity for Smirnov to prove 
that he still enjoys the support of the people in that region. The large public became 
more aware about Smirnov's and his family illegal business. Under these 
circumstances the only chance for Smirnov to preserve voters' confidence was to 
exploit their mentality - the way they see Transdnestria as a fortress besieged by 
malicious Chisinau forces.  
 
Smirnov regarded September 1 introduction of new custom stamps by the Republic of 
Moldova as an economic blockade. In an effort to keep alive the hopes of the 
Transdnestrian citizens that their country enjoys a support from abroad and that under 
his leadership they would heroically overcome the Chisinau blockade, Smirnov made 
some diplomatic maneuvers. His plan partially succeeded. Smirnov managed to 
synchronize several actions. Firstly, Gagauz leaders started a pressing on Chisinau, 
threatening with secessionism unless their claims of federalization or con-
federalization of the Republic of Moldova are ignored. This pressing was aimed to  
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show Transdnestrian citizens that reaching an agreement with Chisinau, as was the 
case of Gagauzia, wouldn't solve the conflict at all. Secondly, Smirnov managed to 
meet with the Belarus President Lukashenko and Ukraine President Kuchima. Later 
on he speculated that Transdnestria's Slavic brothers de facto recognize its status. 
Kuchima even contributed to annihilation of the effects the introduction of custom 
seals was supposed to have on Transdnestria. On the other hand, President Voronin 
managed to prevent Moscow's open support to Smirnov regime. Furthermore, the fact 
that Moldova and Russia signed the Basic Treaty and anti-Smirnov reports on the 
Russian TV are an illustration of Russia's support to Voronin rather than Smirnov in 
this conflict. Russian political analysts speculated on the price Moldova would have 
to pay for this favor. Namely, federalization of the Republic of Moldova having 3 
equal components: Moldova, Transdnestria and Gagauzia under the protection of 
Russia.  
 
The question is whether the benefits Moldova is expecting are worth the price it has to 
pay? After his victory, Smirnov will claim that the fate of the so-called Transdnestrian 
people (which also including 60.000 Russian citizens) may not be decided without 
him. Voronin's strategy to make a distinction between Transdnestrian people and its 
leadership is pointless, given the fact that Smirnov was voted by 85% of the 
population. A week prior to elections Russian Ambassador to Moldova reiterated 
what President Putin said earlier this year - a solution to Transdnestrian conflict will 
be found only as a result of negotiations of five parties, i.e. Chisinau, Tiraspol, 
Moscow, Kiev and OSCE.  
 
Despite his believe that this is a non-sense, eventually Voronin will have to make a 
sacrifice and start negotiations with Smirnov.  
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